We explain federal funds target rate decisions using macroeconomic variables and Federal 
Related Literature and Our Contribution
There is an ongoing theoretical debate about the usefulness of central bank communication.
The vast majority of researchers highlight the positive effects of communication in terms of enhancing central bank transparency (see, e.g., Woodford, 2005; Sibert, 2006; Gosselin et al., 2007) . 1 Well-executed communication aids private agents in recognizing the central bank's objectives and strategy. Furthermore, it also increases understanding of recent target rate changes and prepares the market for future target rate changes. If an interest rate decision is already expected by market participants, their adjustment costs will be minimized (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001 ), as they can take the expected interest rate decision into consideration in advance of it taking effect.
The extent to which central bank communication has been successful in practice is an empirical issue (for a broad overview of the literature, see Blinder et al., 2008) . Generally, the literature discussing communication as an instrument for explaining target rate decisions employs a Taylor-rule framework. There are only a few studies on the Fed, which we review first. Pakko (2005) finds that post-meeting statements convey useful information for forecasting changes in the federal funds rate target, even after controlling for policy responses to inflation and the output gap. Lapp and Pearce (2000) show that a bias in the statement accompanying Federal Reserve policy decisions significantly affects the probability that the target will be changed in the period between two meetings. Lapp et al. (2003) discover that Fed decisions are not highly predictable using publicly available data, and that adding private information contained in the Greenbook (available after a five-year delay) does not significantly increase predictive accuracy. All three studies underestimate the explanative and predictive power of Fed communication, as they neglect the less formal channel of speeches, which can be used more timely and accurately than post-meeting statements. Thus, we expect our approach to be more successful as it explicitly addresses this problem.
Other papers assess the predictive power of European Central Bank (ECB) communication. Jansen and de Haan (2009) find that communication-based models do not outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting decisions. Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) show that a wording indicator measuring the "hawkishness" of the ECB's monthly press conferences can improve the model's fit when added to the standard explanatory variables. However, a model based solely on this indicator performs worse than the baseline Taylor rule. Gerlach (2007) estimates empirical reaction functions using the ECB's Monthly Bulletin as a guide in choosing variables. Overall, in regard to the ECB, there is no evidence for an improvement of a Taylor rule due to more timely and accurate information possibly spread by communication. Nonetheless, similar to the literature on the Fed, we suspect that these studies underestimate the total effect of communication, as they do not include all types of ECB communication.
In this paper, we explain federal funds target rate decisions using macroeconomic variables and Federal Reserve communication indicators. To our knowledge, which is backed up by Blinder et al.'s (2008) 
Data and Econometric Methodology
In this paper, we present the empirical results of estimating different variations of a Taylor rule (see Section 4), including: (i) a pure Taylor rule using only lagged target rate decisions and macroeconomic variables; (ii) target rate decisions modeled as depending on lagged decisions and communication variables; and (iii) an assessment of a model that includes both macroeconomic and communication variables.
Our analysis takes advantage of a new data set introduced by Hayo et al. (2008) , which includes indicator variables for 1,423 speeches and 148 congressional hearings, covering all governors and regional presidents of the Federal Reserve System, as well as 67 post-meeting statements and 20 monetary policy reports. The communications are sorted into three categories depending on whether they indicate likely increases in the federal funds rate, decreases in the rate, or no change in the target rate. Communications that directly reference monetary policy are easily interpreted; others are not so straightforward. For example, speeches presenting a bright economic outlook can be interpreted as an indication of future rate hikes because in good economic times, the Fed needs to take steps to prevent the economy from overheating. Hayo et al. (2008) (Figure 1a) is less subject to an overly optimistic economic outlook; it reflects the Fed's interest rate setting very well. One drawback is its availability: the Fed has 3 In a very few cases, a positive economic outlook coincides with a trend toward loose monetary policy, or a pessimistic outlook is accompanied by tighter monetary policy. As the monetary policy stance is a more direct indicator of future target rate decisions, we code these rare cases based on monetary policy stance. 4 We could also use a scale up to +2 (down to -2) when both monetary policy and economic outlook point in the same direction. However, as pointed out earlier, the Fed increased the frequency and the content of its communication gradually during our sample, so a scaling up to +2 could distort the results as earlier speeches often lack a monetary policy part. Furthermore, it is questionable whether an indication via both variables makes a rate change more likely. Finally, preliminary estimations show that the +1/0/-1 coding approach is more appropriate. 5 For example, in our view, eight indications of higher monetary policy do not result in an eight-times-higher probability of a rate hike. Consequently, we use the +1/0/-1 scale and ensure the validity of our results with extensive robustness tests. We also controlled for the time distance to the upcoming interest rate decision when creating our communication indicator. Information with regard to the upcoming interest rate decision could be considered more useful the closer the communication takes place to the actual event. However, in our sample, using this additional information slightly decreases the explanatory power of our indicator. Note: The federal funds target rate is the black line. For the communication indicator, + means that the indicator suggests rate increase, • that the rate is expected to be constant, and -means that the indicator suggests a rate decrease.
Our econometric methodology is a variation of the interest rate setting rule proposed by Taylor (1993) . We use real-time data (Orphanides, 2001 ) available at the time the interest 6 Since May 1999, the Fed makes a regular statement after every interest rate decision. As we are interested in the last statement, this change is effective for the interest rate decision in June 1999. Prior to May 1999, statements were made only after actual rate changes. Central banks need to be forwardlooking when planning interest rate decisions, as the maximum monetary policy effect reaches the real economy with a lag of about 12-18 months. Therefore, we employ forward-looking indicators measuring the output gap and inflation (expectations) instead of backward-looking ones based on past economic conditions. A study by Molodtsova et al. (2008) supports our choice; they estimate Taylor rules for the United States and discover that the best fit occurs using real-time output data and inflation forecasts.
We take the perspective of financial agents who want to predict interest rate setting by the Fed. As internal Greenbook data are available only after a five year delay, agents must proxy the Fed's estimates of the relevant macroeconomic variables. Therefore, we utilize the ISM Manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index as a proxy for the forward-looking output gap (Hu and Philipps, 2004 To ensure stationarity of expected inflation, we compute first differences. The output gap is derived based on the relative deviation of the ISM index from its expansion threshold value at 50 points. Econometrically, we use an ordered probit model to account for the discrete nature of U.S. target rate decisions (Lapp et al., 2003; Jansen and de Haan, 2009 ). Our specification is:
where is the latent continuous variable representing the change in the federal funds target rate. Again, we use a ternary variable (+1 represents a rate hike; 0 an unchanged rate; -1 a rate cut) to describe the change in monetary policy.
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Target rate 7 The macroeconomic data used in this survey were taken from the St. Louis Fed's Archival Federal Reserve Economic Database. 8 Preliminary regressions reveal that including the actual level of inflation (see, e.g., Gerlach, 2007) in Equation (1) yields negative and insignificant coefficients for several inflation measures as well as a diminished ability to explain interest rate decisions. 9 Both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) show that the output gap series and the first difference of the inflation series are stationary. ISM Gap: ADF -2.09**, KPSS 0.105; Δ(Inflation Expectations): ADF -10.46***, KPSS 0.096. The ADF test assumes a unit root under the null hypothesis. The KPSS test assumes that the series is stationary under the null hypothesis. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level. 10 During our sample period, the Fed raised or lowered the target rate 10 times by 50 bps, and 29 times by 25 bps. Instead of the ternary variable, we could use a quintuple (+2/+1/0/-1/-2) variable to describe Fed behavior. It turns out that the modeling describes very well whether rate hikes/cuts occur or not, but it largely fails to differentiate between small and large interest rate steps. This is also a problem in other studies (e.g., Jansen and de Haan, 2009 (Lapp and Pearce, 2000; Pakko, 2005) and our communication indicator. The residuals ε t are assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, which implies that the probabilities of the different outcomes can be written as:
where Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and z t is our vector of explanatory variables. The ordered probit models are estimated by maximum likelihood (Maddala, 2006) and the threshold variables are obtained simultaneously with the vector of estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables β.
Explaining Target Rate Decisions with Federal Reserve Communications
In this section, we present the results of our empirical estimations employing different specifications based on Equation (1). Column (1) of Table 1 shows the model based on macroeconomic news only,
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Column (2) incorporates communication variables only, and the Column (3) specification uses both types of information.
Measured by the pseudo R 2 , the joint model (Column (3)) has a slightly better fit than the communication model in Column (2), whereas the macro model (Column (1)) is clearly the worst. Interest rate smoothing is evident in all three specifications, as lagged target rate decisions help predict current ones. The coefficients of inflation expectation and output gap are significant in the Taylor-rule model and they remain significant in the joint model. The same is true of both communication variables (last post-meeting statement and 11 We employ a lagged dependent variable rather than an autoregressive error specification (Rudebusch, 2002) based on results presented by Castelnuovo (2003) . Note, however, that the interpretation of interest rate smoothing behavior is still a subject of debate (Rudebusch, 2006 is not an improvement on Model (2) as it mis-predicts one more event than does Model (2). Table 2 shows the average marginal effects.
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In the Taylor rule specification (Model (1)), the probability of a target rate hike goes up by 27.4 percentage points (pp) after a hike was implemented after the last meeting (instead of an unchanged target rate), while the probability of a rate cut increases by 19.9 pp after a decrease in the variable. If the output gap rises, a rate hike is more likely by 1.2 percentage point, whereas after a corresponding reduction, the probability of a cut goes up by 0.7 pp. Finally, higher inflation expectations raise the chance of a rate hike by 11.2 pp, while a decline increases the likeliness of a cut by 6.8 pp. In the joint model, the average marginal effects of both macro variables become smaller, suggesting collinearity with the communication variables. The latter's average marginal effects remain significant, and similar to the values shown for Model (2).
Consequently, the information in Federal Reserve communication partly crowds out publicly available information about the output gap and inflation expectations. The influence of the last post-meeting statement is larger than that of the communication indicator in Models (2) and (3), implying that the Fed follows its interest rate course between two meetings (see Figures 1a and 1b) , whereas the communication indicator provides less new information.
To this point, we have shown the importance of the communication variables for explaining the Fed's target rate decisions. In a next step, we compare the probability of 16 The lesser impact of the lagged interest rate cannot be clearly assigned to either last statements or the communication indicator. There are five decisions where Model (2) gains 75 percentage points or more over Model (1); in six other cases, the increase is at least 25 pp. In contrast, there is no case where Model (2) performs more poorly than 50 pp, the worst performance being -38 pp. The average gain of the pure communication model over the pure Taylor-rule model is 11 pp.
Thus, as expected, use of communication indicators, because they are more timely and accurate, substantially improves the probability of making the correct prediction.
Given the absence of necessary data, we cannot study the models' out-of-sample performance. However, to approximate an out-of-sample assessment, we re-estimate Models
(1)- (3) initially for the subsample 1998-2002. Then, we predict target rate decisions for the remaining period using recursive out-of-sample forecasts, which requires re-estimating the model after every period. 17 We start by estimating each model using the first 43 observations and then evaluate whether the model correctly predicts the interest rate decision at t = 44. Next, we re-estimate the models using the first 44 observations and predict the outcome at t = 45, and so on. As an alternative to recursive estimations, we can test temporal stability by estimating parameters over the period 1998-2002 and using the resulting models to derive predictions by plugging in values of the relevant variables in each period. Table 4 shows that the communication model (Model (2)) holds up extremely well with regard to stability, whereas
Model (1), and Model (3) even more so, suffer from a deterioration of predictive ability. Testing parameter instability using Chow-type tests at a 5% confidence level (see (1) and (2) (1) Taylor 
Further Results and Robustness Tests
The outcome of alternative specifications and robustness tests are given in Table 5 . Poole of risks" terminology with more forward-looking language. Model (4) of Table 5 explores whether this forward-looking indicator exerts a different impact on the predictability of target rate decisions. We cannot statistically distinguish between either indicator (Chi 2 (1) = 1.11),
implying that the change in language did not improve the predictive power of Fed communications.
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Four unscheduled interest rate changes occurred between meetings during our sample period. Model (5) of Table 5 explores the robustness of our findings with respect to inter-18 Another effort to increase transparency was implemented in January 2002: henceforward, the names of dissenting members were included in the post-meeting statement. Previously, this information had not been available until the minutes were released following the subsequent Federal Reserve meeting. To control for dissenting votes, we include a variable measuring the lagged dissenter's impact. The prior is that any dissent in the last meeting in either direction should increase the probability of a rate decision in line with the dissenter's vote. Unfortunately, we have collinearity problems, as the model converges only if all communication variables are excluded. However, even in this setup involving fewer explanatory variables, the dissenter's impact is statistically insignificant. Results are available on request. Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Huber/White robust standard errors are used.
Model (6) of Table 5 To answer these questions, we need to shorten our sample period to May 1999-May 2004 (43 observations) so as to match that of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) . In line with the procedure sketched above, we derive a communication indicator for the news agency data.
Since the newswire information does not include post-meeting statements, we omit these from our set of communication variables to ensure comparability. Table 6 reports the results using the communication indicator created on the basis of our data (Model (7)), the newswire reports (Model (8)), and using both indicators in one equation (Model (9)). 
Conclusions
In this paper, we explain federal funds target rate decisions by means of macroeconomic by monthly economic data. 22 For example, in 2007, the Fed announced that it will make economic projections for longer periods (three years instead of two) and distribute these more often (four times a year instead of two) in an effort to shed light on the likely path of interest rates and optimal levels of inflation.
